市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。

Market Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
+ o) P3 G" p8 o8 C# NJames Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
- F. h. b: g/ K2 O3 H. kSignature Global Advisors


  `* N! s2 O4 d$ l) v! ~$ PBackground remarks
( l* m, ?! N) L! v0 s* Q Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
as much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
 Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
$ R+ T/ n+ K6 p5 z: q This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
safety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
* h! W3 }' L: x, i) J- d6 } We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
6 R" G; T% {: cadjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
& s! |& U# [0 ~ Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
0 q. ?. [  _2 @  A1 ~ Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
6 {7 d- Z& G& P  l. ~+ }+ V* c Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

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Current situation
: F; {9 h; N* S7 U3 ]- H The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
as funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
) E* S2 d7 s% z1 k9 S% ^3 Timpose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
 The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
4 w7 t/ E6 u, U* sscrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
& x" P. x. x; K) _2 C' ^+ N
A look at credit markets
 Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
1 R. i$ i& Y3 z* A: c4 ^/ ^7 C$ J* v6 j High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
" \% z% ?! K5 ~" z! B8 rthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
5 B- l7 z# M9 V: Kbillion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
6 w9 Z0 O9 b# Z( spositive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
 Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
, T5 b  x7 m5 z! C9 H5 c% h3 N8 Pfinding financing.
+ Z; |0 C/ {" K7 `3 h* M  T Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
- |9 U+ b  g6 L( ewere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
 Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
9 O3 s, l4 R4 |: J1 a% p0 _going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
bankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
3 _* _8 o( ?9 G0 D+ dtoday.
5 l, h, J* r8 a2 X$ i6 Y6 R) {* A Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
! v: t1 W0 \) q" j+ z+ uemerging markets have no problem with funding.

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European Union agenda
 Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
& r/ c, D: w7 J7 @* _1 m As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
% {7 r' A, Z3 a" \1 _+ \4 y2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
/ `. a- }, P* l* w. }debt stabilization, needs government approvals.
3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
* L1 h+ P0 S; B8 `0 k, [banks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.

9 a2 g% z" K( s2 V7 cBeyond Greece
 The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
 It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

Conclusion
) U+ s2 {$ b6 Z' r9 i We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

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